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Two main results have been obtained on the literature on contractual solutions to
the hold-up problem. First, a contract specifying a price and quantity of the …nal good
to be traded will, fairly generally, induce e¢cient investments if these are ‘sel…sh’ in
nature, i.e., each party’s investment directly a¤ects only his own pro…t (Edlin and Re-
ichelstein, 1996). Second, and in contrast, no contract however complicated is of any
value in reducing the ine¢ciency if the investments are ‘cooperative’, i.e., each party’s
investment a¤ects directly only the other party’s payo¤ (Che and Hausch, 1999).
We show that courts of law may play a more important role in real contract disputes
than has been realized. The key observation is that the presence of a court can make
it valuable to specify putative investment levels in a contract - even if the court re-
mains ignorant of the parties’ actual investment levels. This is because the putative
investment levels in‡uence the expected damages the court awards if it decides that
breach occurred. The probability of the court deciding breach occurred is independent
of the actual investment levels - they remain entirely unveri…able. It depends at most
on the parties’ court expenditures. These expenditures make litigation costly for the
parties, and, therefore, in equilibrium they settle before trial. The presence of even
such an imperfect court has a signi…cant impact on whether contracts alleviate hold-up
ine¢ciencies. In the case of one-sided cooperative investment, we show that the …rst-
best outcome can sometimes be achieved by the adoption of a simple non-contingent
contract, contrary to the negative result of Che and Hausch (1999). Our result extends
to the case of hybrid investment, provided the investment is mainly cooperative.
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The hold-up problem arises in situations of bilateral trade when complete contracts are not
available and relationship speci…c investments are required. The under-investment problem
that may result was …rst analyzed by Coase in the early 1930s,1 and, more recently, by
Williamson (1985), Grout (1984), and Hart and Moore (1988). The literature later developed
proposed contractual and non-contractual solutions to this hold-up problem (see Section 2 for
a review of the literature). Two main results on contractual solutions to the hold-up problem
have been obtained. First, a simple contract specifying the price and quantity of the …nal
good to be traded will, fairly generally, induce e¢cient investments if the investments are
‘sel…sh’ in nature – i.e., if each party’s investment directly a¤ects only his own pro…t (Edlin
and Reichelstein, 1996). Second, and in contrast, no contract however complicated is of any
value in reducing the ine¢ciency if the investments are ‘cooperative’ in nature, i.e., if each
party’s investment directly a¤ects only the other party’s pro…t (Che and Hausch, 1999).
We maintain the assumption that investment is observable but not veri…able, and re-
examine these previous results by taking into account the potential role of costly litigation
and imperfect courts of law. The court in our model is assumed to obtain no information
about the actual investment levels – they remain entirely unveri…able. To reduce the court’s
apparent usefulness, the probability of it deciding breach occurred is assumed to be inde-
pendent of whether breach actually occurs. Since litigation is costly and there is complete
information, in equilibrium the parties will settle before going to court. The presence of
even such an imperfect court has a signi…cant impact on whether contracts alleviate hold-up
ine¢ciencies.
In the case of cooperative investment, the key observation is that the presence of a
court can make it valuable to specify putative investment levels in a contract – even if the
court remains ignorant of the parties’ actual investment levels. This is because the putative
investment levels in‡uence the expected damages the court awards when it decides that
breach occurred. In the case of one-sided cooperative investment, we show that a simple non-
1See Coase (2000), where he refers to his letters sent to Ronald Fowler about this issue in 1932 (p. 17).
2contingent contract can be valuable, and the …rst-best outcome can sometimes be achieved,
contrary to the negative result of Che and Hausch (1999). Our result extends to the case
of hybrid investment (investment a¤ects both the seller’s costs and the buyer’s valuation),
provided the main e¤ect of the seller’s investment is to enhance the buyer’s valuation.
In the case of sel…sh investment, the result that a simple contract can induce the …rst-best
level of investment (Edlin and Reichelstein, 1996) remains valid in general.
The literature on the hold-up problem, and the contract theory literature in general,
typically assumes that courts of law enforce the letter of the contract at no cost.2 Parties
are restricted to contract only on veri…able variables; but once this restriction is met, parties
can rely on a court to enforce their agreement at no cost. That is, courts impose speci…c
performance on any veri…able variables and they are silent about any non-veri…able variable.
On the other hand, the literature in law and economics takes a di¤erent approach to
modeling litigation. Most of this literature assumes that going to court is costly and/or that
the litigation outcome depends probabilistically on the parties’ actions (i.e., how much they
spend during trial, and, possibly, on past actions). Moreover, in reality, contracts typically
include non-veri…able clauses, like the commitment to negotiate ‘in good faith’, or to make
their ‘best e¤ort’.
We take the law and economics literature approach by assuming litigation is costly and
that the grounds for suing are given by a non-veri…able variable.
In our setup, only the seller invests before the transaction takes place. A simple contract
will include a quantity to trade, an up-front payment, and a putative investment level.3 The
breaching of a contract does not refer, as in most of the literature on the hold-up problem,
to the seller (buyer) refusing to deliver (accept) the good. Instead, we assume the buyer
2An exception is Anderlini, Felli and Postlewaite (2001), where the court, at the request of one of the
parties, may choose to void the original contract if it considers that some ‘unforeseen contingency’ has
occurred.
3Throughout the paper we use the expressions non-contingent contract and simple contract in an inter-
changeable way, as opposed to more complex contracts like menu contracts or contracts that include messages
games.
3may go to court, claim that the seller did not ful…ll the terms of the contract, and ask for
damages to be awarded.4 With some …xed probability the court …nds the seller breached the
contract and with the complementary probability it …nds she did not breach it. In case of
breach, the seller pays expected damages to the buyer and, we assume, parties are no longer
bound by the original contract.
Court Practices - De…nitions
Expected damages are de…ned as the amount of money that would make the breach victim
indi¤erent to receiving that money and to the contract being ful…lled. If the seller is judged
to have fully breached the contract, the expected damages she has to pay would be the
buyer’s value of the goods to be traded minus what he was supposed to pay. In this case,
parties would be no longer bound by the terms of the original contract.5
Alternatively, the court could …nd that the seller only partially breached the contract. In
this case damages should only cover the di¤erence in the buyer’s value from what it would
have been if the contract terms were ful…lled. The concept of partial breaching is related
to a duty to mitigate damages by the breach victim. If this duty applies, the victim may
be forced to accept the good that does not conform to the contract and be compensated
only for the di¤erence between the value of the contractually speci…ed good and what the
breaching party is o¤ering.
We assume throughout that any breaching is considered total breaching. The assump-
tion makes sense in the context of the hold-up problem where the non-veri…ability of the
investment is the root of the problem. If the breaching is considered total and the court
4Given our contract de…nition, the buyer’s claim before the court would be that the seller did not invest
the contractually speci…ed amount. But there is nothing special about the breaching being related to the
investment level. We could instead include an extra variable re‡ecting ‘other aspects’ of the contract (possibly
payo¤ irrelevant), and assume the breaching refers to these other aspects.
5This does not mean the contract is voided. If the court ruling is to void the contract, then the buyer
has no right to collect damages, only to recover any up-front payments made.
If a contract is voided, the buyer must be left in the same situation as if the contract was never signed
while in the case of expected damages, the buyer must be left as if the terms of contract were ful…lled.
4grants expected damages, all the court needs to know is the buyer’s valuation of the goods
for the contractually speci…ed investment. On the other hand, in order for the court to
award ‘partial breaching damages’, it would also need an estimation of what the seller really
invested. Under these circumstances we may expect the court would be inclined to consider
any breaching as total breaching.
Moreover, quoting Edlin (1996):
“...This duty to mitigate [damages] is broader than often obtains. For instance, in
Parker v. Twentieth Century-Fox [1970], the California Supreme Court held that
Shirley MacLaine Parker did not need to accept Twentieth Century’s o¤er to star
in a western titled ‘Big Country, Big Man’ to mitigate damages for Twentieth
Century’s breach of the contract in which she was to star in a musical titled
‘Bloomer Girl’. Also, in the context of the sale of goods, under the Uniform
Commercial Code Section 2-601, the buyer has the right to ‘reject the whole’ if
‘the goods or the tender of delivery fail in any respect to conform to the contract.’
Moreover, under Section 2-711 a ‘rightful’ rejection by the buyer leaves her with
the same remedies as if the seller had not performed at all...”6
Instead of expected damages, the court could, in principle, award liquidated damages to
the victim of breach. Liquidated damages are speci…ed by the parties in the original contract
and are typically enforced “only if (a) at the time of contracting, the damage that the
promisee will su¤er in the event of breach (that is, the promisee’s expectation) is uncertain,
and (b) the amount of liquidated damages is both a reasonable estimate of (the mean of)
those damages and are not disproportionate to the actual (ex post) damages. A larger
amount is called a ‘penalty’ and is unenforceable” (Mahoney, 1999). We brie‡y consider the
case of liquidated damages in Section 6.
A third option for the court is to award reliance damages.I nc a s eo fb r e a c h ,t h ep r o m i s e e
is compensated for whichever investment speci…c to the relationship he has made. In our
6His results depend on the assumption that the court considers the breaching as partial breaching and
he advocates in favor of the breach victim having a broad duty to mitigate damages.
5model, reliance damages make no sense since the investing party is the potential breacher.
To sum up, we assume the buyer can sue the seller for not investing the amount speci…ed
in the contract, and that the court will either uphold the contract or, if it …nds breach, grant
expected damages to the buyer.7 We do not claim that this court behavior is optimal.8 We
simply take a positive standpoint here: a party can sue the other for virtually anything,
and it has some chances of being successful.9 We also assume the probability that the court
…nds the seller breached the contract is independent of the actual investment. This is an
7Alternatively, we could assume that the buyer can go to the court and ask for the contract to be voided.
Quoting Anderlini et al (2001):
“...There are two primary categories under which this [a contract being voided] might happen.
The …rst is impracticability of performance, that is, when unanticipated events subsequent to
contracting have made the promised performance impossible. The second category is termed
frustration of purpose. One view of frustration is that it will ‘...excuse performance where
performance remains possible, but the value of performance to at least one of the parties and
the basic reason recognized by both parties for entering into the contract have been destroyed
by a supervening and unforeseen event’...”
Note that in this case the buyer would not need to claim the seller breached the contract at all, simply
that some ‘unforeseen contingencies’ have arose.
Although this is not a plausible court ruling in a world with no uncertainty, we discuss in Section 6 how
our results are a¤ected if the court voids the contract rather than award expected damages (the insight
derived there would also be valid in a model with uncertainty).
8Alternatively, an optimizing court may do better. Anderlini et al. (2001) assume the court is an
optimizing player (whose interests are aligned with those of the contracting parties). Restricted to either
voiding or upholding a contract, the court balances the trade-o¤ between providing incentives to invest and
providing insurance in the case of ‘extreme’ unforeseen contingencies.
9Some examples can illustrate this point: “A surfer recently sued another surfer for ‘taking his wave.’
The case was ultimately dismissed because they were unable to put a price on ‘pain and su¤ering’ endured
by watching someone ride the wave that was ‘intended for you.”’ (Source: CALA).
“A jury awarded $178,000 in damages to a woman who sued her former …ancée for breaking their seven-
week engagement. The breakdown: $93,000 for pain & su¤ering; $60,000 for loss of income from her legal
practice, and $25,000 for psychiatric counseling expenses.” (Source: CALA)
6extreme assumption, but it is needed to be consistent with the standard assumption in hold-
up models that investment is non veri…able. Obviously, a court with some ability to verify
investment levels could enforce more complete contracts and so, in general, do better.
Results
Assuming this is the way courts work, we study whether non-contingent contracts can
be used to achieve an outcome more e¢cient than the one induced with no contract.
We focus for most of the paper on the case of cooperative investment; speci…cally, the
investment is made by the seller and a¤ects only the the buyer’s valuation for the good. We
choose a very simple model in which the court is characterized by three parameters and a
function: the buyer’s probability of winning, the buyer’s and seller’s litigation costs, and the
‘damage function’, which is assumed to depend only on the contractual terms (but not on
the actual investment). This is for expositional simplicity only. The results hold in a more
general setup in which the buyer’s probability of winning and damages are functions of the
parties’ endogenously chosen court expenditures. We discuss in some detail this extension
in Section 6.
The simpler model, however, helps highlight the main point of the paper: in the case of
cooperative investment, where contracts have no value if enforcement is costless (Che and
Hausch, 1999), the parties can use the fact that litigation is costly to implement a more
e¢cient outcome even though no information is revealed during the trial process.
The idea is fairly intuitive. Although no information about the actual investment is
revealed during the trial, the buyer’s incentives to bring a suit do depend on the actual
investment: the less the seller invested, the more valuable it is for the buyer to get out of
the contract. Therefore, the parties can design a contract such that if the seller invests a
certain level the buyer is exactly indi¤erent to either suing or not suing. The exact value of
this critical investment level can, to some extent, be determined by the players when they
sign the contract.
If the investment is slightly below that critical level, the buyer prefers to sue. In such a
case the buyer’s payo¤ increases, since it is equal to his expected payo¤ of going to court
7(approximately equal to his not-suing payo¤), plus the fraction of the total trial costs he
appropriates in the renegotiation process. Since the total surplus is nearly the same, the seller
su¤ers a loss when she slightly decreases her investment. This gives the seller incentives to
invest.
The relevance of our results relies on the fact that we consider simple contracts and a
realistic court game. It is well known, after Maskin and Tirole (1999), that the parties could
achieve a …rst-best outcome if courts were able to enforce contracts that specify ex-post
ine¢cient outcomes. There is an open debate in the literature on which mechanisms parties
can use to be committed to ex-post ine¢cient outcomes. Beyond the potential enforceability
of such mechanisms, we do not observe them in reality. Our results are a potential answer to
this divorce between theory and reality. When parties face litigation costs and courts award
expectation damages, simple contracts that can later be renegotiated can give the parties
the right incentives. In these cases, there is no need for complicated message game contracts
and devices to prevent renegotiation.
Outline
Section 2 discusses previous literature on the hold-up problem and some related law and
economics literature. Section 3 presents the basic model. In Section 4, a numeric example
is presented to illustrate our results in a simple way. The general results are presented in
S e c t i o n5a n di nS e c t i o n6w ed i s c u s sp o s s i b l ee x t e n s i o n so ft h eb a s i cm o d e l .W ec o n c l u d e
in Section 7 by discussing our results in the context of the mechanism design literature.
2. Related Literature
Our work belongs to the literature on contractual solutions to the hold-up problem.10 Chung
(1991), Aghion, Dewatripont and Rey (1994) and Noldeke and Schmidt (1995) assume that
parties can, in di¤erent ways, manipulate the mechanism they will use to revise the original
10A di¤erent approach looks at the possible role of di¤erent institutional arrangements such as vertical
integration (Klein, Crawford, and Alchian, 1978), shifting property rights (Grossman and Hart, 1986 and
Hart and Moore, 1990) and authority relationships (Aghion and Tirole, 1997).
8contract and assign all the bargaining power to one party. This party becomes the residual
claimant at the renegotiation stage and, therefore, has the right incentives to invest. By
choosing the appropriate quantity in the original contract they a¤ect the threat point in the
renegotiation process and give the second party incentives to invest e¢ciently.
Edlin and Reichelstein (1996) highlight the importance of integrating to the analysis the
breach remedies courts may use. Unlike Chung (1991), Aghion et al. (1994) and Noldeke
and Schmidt (1995), they assume the bargaining powers are exogenously given (and both
parties have some). For the case of one sided sel…sh investment, they show that both speci…c
performance and expected damages allow the parties to design a contract such that the
…rst-best is achieved. If both parties are supposed to invest, only the speci…c performance
remedy allows the parties to attain the …rst-best.11
In the case of cooperative investment, Che and Hausch (1999) show that when parties
cannot manipulate the renegotiation process (and both parties have some bargaining power),
then not only is the …rst-best not achievable, but also no contract out-performs the null
contract.12
As it is standard in the literature, Che and Hausch (1999) and Edlin and Reichelstein
11A related branch of the literature compares the e¢ciency of remedies to breach. Early works by Shavell
(1980) and Rogerson (1984) show the potential incentives to overinvest in a relationship if the legal remedy is
either the expectation damage rule or the reliance damage rule. In contrast, appropriate stipulated damages
can induce an e¢cient level of investment.
Edlin (1994) shows that the result of Shavell (1980) and Rogerson (1984) does not hold when we combine
‘cadillac contracts’ (that ensure only one party will have incentives to breach) with up-front payments.
E¢ciency can be achieved under the expected damage rule combined with a broad duty to mitigate damages.
Ishiguro (1999) shows the convenience of an expected damage remedy over speci…c performance in a setup
where only the seller invests and this investment reduces its costs. Che and Chung (1999) compare the
e¢ciency of di¤erent legal remedies when investment is cooperative. In contrast to previous results, they
…nd that speci…c performance is optimal when the court can without bias estimate the investment made.
12Earlier, MacLeod and Malcomson (1993) studied the case of one sided cooperative investment. Assuming
the court can distinguish the cases where the parties do not trade at all from those where they exercise an
outside option, and that the court enforces penalty payments in the latter case, then the e¢cient level of
investment can be induced.
9(1996) assume that parties are constrained to contract only on veri…able variables and the
court can always at no cost enforce speci…c performance if one of the parties requires it. Our
paper assumes a completely di¤erent enforcement technology, exploring the potential role of
simple contracts when litigation is costly and courts are imperfect.
The fact that we choose a more realistic court game relates our paper to the law and
economics literature. Concerned with di¤erent issues (optimality of the fee shifting rule,
comparing the inquisitorial vs. the adversarial regimes, etc.), several papers model the
litigation process as a rent-seeking game (Froeb and Kobayashi, 2000, and Gong and McAfee,
2000).13
Bull and Watson (2001) model the court game as one where parties present documents
and the court rules according to the evidence presented. Di¤erent sets of documents may be
available in di¤erent states, and this a¤ects the set of outcomes that may be implemented.
Within this basic framework, Bull (2001a) studies the relative merits of an inquisitorial sys-
tem vs. an adversarial system (when there are costs of producing and suppressing evidence).
Bull (2001b) departs from the basic framework of Bull and Watson (2001) by assuming
documents are costly to produce; he analyzes the potential role of redundant documents
(two documents are redundant if they are available in the same states) to enlarge the set of
implementable outcomes.
Ishiguro (2002) is related to our paper, he also shows the value of the expected damage
rule in an incomplete contracting setting. He considers a moral hazard model where the
action the agent takes is observable and ‘endogenously’ veri…able. He models a court game
where the agent can spend resources, and his action is veri…ed by the court with some prob-
ability that depends on the amount he spends. Ishiguro provides a necessary and su¢cient
13Bernardo et al. (2000) and Sanchirico (2000) consider models where the outcome of the court game
depends not only on what the parties do in that stage (i.e., how much they spend), but also on some past
actions. For example, in a car accident, the probability of being found guilty is larger for someone that has
been negligent than for someone that took adequate precautions. Alternatively, it might be cheaper for an
innocent defendant to generate exculpatory evidence and, depending on the way the court rules, he might
be able to signal his innocence by outspending a guilty one.
10condition for the existence of a contract that induces the …rst-best action.14 Ac o n t r a c ti n
his setting is a menu that speci…es a payment for each di¤erent action. In equilibrium, the
agent takes the …rst-best action, the principal breaches the contract by paying a wage less
than the contractually speci…ed wage for the …rst-best action, and, nonetheless, the agent
has no incentives to go to court. Our result has a similar ‡avor: the contract is typically
breached in equilibrium and the buyer (the principal) has no incentives to go to court when
the seller invested e¢ciently.
Our model di¤ers in several aspects from Ishiguro (2002). First and most importantly,
we assume that no information about the agent’s action is revealed in the court process.
Second, we make use of simpler contracts that specify a single action and payment rather
than a menu.15 Third, although litigation is costly and there is complete information, in
Ishiguro (2002) parties cannot avoid trial by settling out of court.
3. The Model
Timing
We consider a situation where after contracting at time 0, the seller (she) chooses an
investment level x 2 [0;X] at time 1; and both players observe it. This investment is purely
cooperative: it increases the valuation of the good for the buyer (he), but it does not a¤ect
her own production costs. He decides whether to sue the seller – claiming she did not invest
the stipulated amount– at time 2 and, if he does, the court game is played at 3.A tt i m e4
the transaction is completed and payo¤s realized.
14This condition relates the productivity of the resources spent in court, the costs for the agent of under-
taking the …rst best e¤ort and the cost of the lowest possible e¤ort.
15This di¤erence is not trivial. In Ishiguro (2002), only the principal can breach the contract by paying
the agent less than what is speci…ed in the contract for the action taken. In our setup, only the agent (seller)
can breach the contract by taking an action di¤erent from the one speci…ed in the contract.
Willington (2002) presents an example in which the veri…cation technology does not satisfy the necessary
and su¢cient condition identi…ed in Ishiguro (2002), and shows that if this veri…cation technology is available
to the principal, then the …rst-best can be attained with a non-contingent contract.
11We allow parties to renegotiate before the buyer decides whether to sue, and then before
the …nal transaction has to be made. Parties will do so before wasting resources in the
court, and, o¤ the equilibrium path, after the court’s ruling.16 We assume the outcome of
the renegotiation process is ex-post e¢cient, and the bargaining powers of the parties are
exogenously given: ¹ for the buyer and 1 ¡ ¹ for the seller.





































; where x 2 [0;X] is the level the seller agrees to invest,
q 2< + is the quantity to be transacted, and t 2<is an up-front payment from the buyer to
the seller.17 Although the investment level is not veri…able, a value for it is included in the
contract. In case of dispute, if the court rules in favor of the buyer, the seller pays damages
that depend on the contracted levels of investment (x), and the quantities to be traded (q):





parties agreed to (it could be the result of a renegotiation either before date 2 or after the
court ruling).
Notation and Assumptions
We denote the buyer’s valuation of q units when the seller invests x as V (x;q); and the
16Allowing the parties to renegotiate after the court ruling implies that the court can not impose ex-post
ine¢cient outcomes on the parties.
17In our model, t plays only a role for dividing the surplus. We will often refer to a contract as a pair
(x;q):
12seller’s cost as C(q): Both are assumed to be continuous and twice di¤erentiable, increasing
in q; equal to zero when q =0 ; and V (x;q)¡C(q) is assumed to be less than zero for q large
enough. We further assume:18
Vx(x;q) > 0 and Vx;q (x;q) > 0 (if q>0). (A1)
We denote by q(x) the e¢cient quantity to be traded when the seller invests x :
q(x) ´ argmax
q
V (x;q) ¡ C(q):
We assume q(x) is unique and strictly positive. Given (A1); this implies q(x) is increasing
in x. Let the total surplus when production is e¢cient be
S (x)=V (x;q (x)) ¡ C (q(x));
and assume it is strictly concave. We denote the maximizer of S (x) ¡ x by xFB:
If no contract is signed, the seller will solve
max
x
(1 ¡ ¹)S(x) ¡ x:
We denote the solution to this problem by xw; and assume xw > 0 (note that xFB >x w).19
A court in our model is a quadruple (F;¯;¾;D(x;q)); where F is the probability the
buyer wins the trial, ¯ and ¾ are the buyer’s and seller’s court costs, and D(x;q) are the
damages the buyer collects from the seller in case of breach when the contract is (x;q):
We assume D(x;q) is continuous, equal to zero if q is zero, and strictly increasing in both
arguments unless q =0 . Moreover, we assume
D(x;q) ¡ (1 ¡ ¹)V (x;q) ¡ ¹C (q)
is strictly quasi-concave, bounded above, and negative for some q large enough.
18Subindexes denote partial derivatives.
19The ‘w’ is standard in the literature and refers to Williamson, who was among the …rst to address this
under-investment problem.
13The canonical example of a damage function is simply D(x;q)=V (x;q), the expectation
damage function.20
Our approach is to take the court (F;¯;¾;D(¢)) as given and characterize the optimal
contract for this court and the corresponding equilibrium investment level. We then charac-
terize the set of courts for which contracting is valuable, and the set for which the …rst-best
is achievable.
Two generalizations of this simple court game are discussed in section 6. The …rst one
is to assume there is a set of courts from which parties can choose. The selection of the
court is then included in the original contract. The second generalization is to model the
court game as a rent-seeking game, where the parties optimally choose ¯ and ¾; and their
decisions a¤ect the trial outcome:
Payo¤s
Note that the renegotiation between dates 1 and 2 can take place under two qualitatively
di¤erent scenarios. Given a contract k and an investment level x; it might be optimal for the
buyer not to sue the seller (N) even if no agreement is reached at this renegotiation stage. In
this case, the threat point is determined exclusively by the original contract, and, therefore,
the payo¤ for the buyer after renegotiating would be
¦
B;N(k;x)=V (x;q)+¹[S (x) ¡ (V (x;q) ¡ C (q))];
where V (x;q) is what he would obtain under the original contract (if the parties do not
renegotiate), and the second term is the fraction of the renegotiation surplus the buyer
appropriates.21
20Note that D(x;q) being an approximation to V (x;q) corresponds to the de…nition of expected damages
because we assumed that t is an up-front payment. If we were to assume that t is a payment to be made at
the moment of the transaction, then the expected damages the buyer should be entitled to collect in case of
breach would be only D(x;q) ¡ t (as an approximation to V (x;q) ¡ t): In both cases, the t only serves the
role of dividing the surplus.
In order to implement expectation damages perfectly the court would have to know the buyer’s valuation
function V (x;q): This might be a strong assumption.
21All payo¤s are net of the up-front payment t:
14On the other hand, if, given (k;x); it is optimal for the buyer to go to court (C) when no
agreement is reached, then the threat point for the renegotiation is given by the payo¤s the
players would obtain if they go to court. Since the parties will settle out of court (S); the
payo¤ for the buyer in this case will be what he would obtain if they go to court, ¦B;C(k;x);




where the buyer’s payo¤ from going to court is
¦
B;C(k;x)=¡¯ + F [D(x;q)+¹S (x)] + (1 ¡ F)¦
B;N(k;x):
If the buyer wins the trial – with probability F – he collects damages D(x;q) and, since
they are then no longer bound by the original contract, he appropriates a fraction ¹ of the
total surplus. If he loses – with probability 1 ¡ F –h eg e t sw h a th ew o u l dh a v er e c e i v e di f
there had been no trial. In both cases, he has to pay his court costs (¯).
Similarly, we can de…ne seller’s payo¤ in the three situations:
¦
S;N(k;x)=¡C (q)+( 1¡ ¹)[S (x) ¡ V (x;q)+C (q)] ¡ x
¦
S;C(k;x)=¡¾ + F [¡D(x;q)+( 1¡ ¹)S (x) ¡ x]+( 1¡ F)¦
S;N(k;x)
¦
S;S(k;x)=( 1 ¡ ¹)(¯ + ¾)+¦
S;C(k;x):
Note that we implicitly assume that after they agree on a new contract, the buyer cannot
sue the seller. This is with no loss of generality. One possibility for the players is to agree
on a contract that speci…es only a quantity to be traded and a payment, which leaves the
buyer with no grounds to sue the seller (in our model the buyer sues claiming the seller did
not invest what she committed to investing). Alternatively, the parties can get the payo¤s
speci…ed above by, between 1 and 2, annulling the contract and agreeing on a payment t0;
and later splitting the surplus S (x) according to their bargaining powers. The annulled
contract guarantees the buyer cannot sue.
22By settling out of court the parties are saving the court costs ¯ + ¾: This is the surplus ‘generated’ in
this renegotiation process.
154. An Illustrative Example
We present a simple example that illustrates the main point of the paper: even though
investment is not veri…able (the enforcement technology is independent of the investment),
players can use a costly and imperfect court to improve on their implementation problem.
Assume that only one or two units can be sold and that the seller can only choose to
invest 0; 2; or 4: Assume the bargaining power for the buyer is ¹ =0 :7 and the buyer’s
valuation and seller’s production cost are










Notice that the e¢cient quantity is one if investment is zero and two if investment is
either two or four. Overall, the e¢cient investment level is two:
S (2) ¡ 2=7 :5 ¡ 3:5 ¡ 2 > 3 ¡ 1:5 ¡ 0=S (0);
S (2) ¡ 2=7 :5 ¡ 3:5 ¡ 2 > 8:9 ¡ 3:5 ¡ 4=S (4) ¡ 4:
Note also that, given the assumption that ¹ is 0:7; there is a hold-up problem: if no
contract is signed and the seller invests 2; she would get 0:3 of the post-investment surplus
and therefore his total payo¤ would be
0:3(7:5 ¡ 3:5) ¡ 2=¡0:8;
while if she chooses x =0she would get
0:3(3¡ 1:5) = 0:45:
Claim 1 below is an implication of Che and Hausch (1999).
Claim 1. When the parties are unable to commit themselves to avoiding renegotiation and
16courts only impose speci…c performance on veri…able variables at no cost, x =2is not an
equilibrium whatever the contract.
Che and Hausch (1999) prove this for arbitrary ‘message game’ contracts. To illustrate
the point, we argue here the simpler case of non-contingent contracts.
Note that the seller’s payo¤ when she invests x and the contract speci…es a quantity q
and a payment t is
t ¡ C (q) ¡ x +( 1¡ ¹)[S (x) ¡ V (x;q)+C (q)]:
The terms t and C (q) are independent of the investment x: Therefore, by increasing x; the
seller only a¤ects S (x) and V (x;q):
Note that the seller appropriates only a fraction (1 ¡ ¹) of the increase in the surplus,
but bears the full cost of the investment x. If this were the only e¤ect of increasing x; the
seller would choose x =0( w eh a v ea l r e a d ys h o w nt h a t(1 ¡ ¹)S (0) > (1 ¡ ¹)S (2) ¡ 2).
The second e¤ect of increasing x is on V (x;q): The larger x is the better the buyer’s bar-
gaining position will be (unless q is zero); and, therefore, this e¤ect reinforces the incentives
to underinvest.
More formally, and after some trivial manipulation, the seller’s payo¤ di¤erential between
investing 2 and 0 c a nb ew r i t t e na s
¦
S;N(k;2) ¡ ¦
S;N(k;0) = f(1 ¡ ¹)[S (2) ¡ S (0)] ¡ 2+0 g¡(1 ¡ ¹)[V (2;q) ¡ V (0;q)]:
The …rst term is negative (that is why there is a hold-up problem in the …rst place) and the
second one is strictly negative for q>0: It is therefore optimal for the seller to choose x =0 .
We now want to illustrate how our alternative enforcement technology can help. Assume





17That is, if the buyer decides to go to court and spends ¯ =3 :4; the court rules, with
probability 0:75; that the seller has breached the contract, and awards damages D(x;q).F o r
simplicity we assume seller’s court costs are zero.
How can this court, which does not extract any information about x and is costly to use,
be helpful? The intuition is the following: the parties sign a contract such that if the seller
invests 2; the buyer prefers not to sue [¦B;N(k;2) ¸ ¦B;C (k;2)]; but if the seller invests 0;
the buyer strictly prefers to sue [¦B;N(k;0) < ¦B;C (k;0)].
This implies that the renegotiation threat point changes: if x =2 ; the threat point is
[¦B;N(k;2); ¦S;N (k;2)]; while if x =0 ; it is [¦B;C(k;0); ¦S;C (k;0)]. If the damages that the
seller has to pay in case the court …nds breaching are large enough, then the seller might
be deterred from investing x =0 . Note, however, that if the damages are too high, then
the buyer will always prefer to sue (i.e., the inequality
£
¦B;N(k;2) ¸ ¦B;C (k;2)
¤
will not
hold), and the seller, given that she will be sued anyway, will choose to underinvest. Claim
2 formalizes the argument.




= f4;2;6:1g induces an investment level x =2and
gives the buyer and seller payo¤s of 1:4 and 0:6; respectively.
Proof: Note that if x =0and the parties do not reach an agreement between dates 1
and 2; the buyer prefers to sue:
¦
B;N (k;0) = 4:9+0 :7(1:5 ¡ 1:4) = 4:97 <
0:25(4:97) + 0:75(8:9+0 :7 ¤ 1:5) ¡ 3:4=5 :305 = ¦
B;C (k;0) ¡ t:





By settling out of court the players then get
¦
B;S (k;0) = 5:305 + 0:7 ¤ 3:4=7 :685
¦
S;S (k;0) = S (0) ¡ ¦
B;S (k;0) = ¡6:185:
On the other hand, if x =2 ; the buyer will not sue the seller:
¦
B;N (k;2) = 7:5 ¸ 0:25(7:5) + 0:75(8:9+0 :7 ¤ 4) ¡ 3:4=7 :25 = ¦
B;C (k;2);




: Since the contract speci…es
the e¢cient quantity (q =2 ), given the investment x =2 , there is no room for renegotiation.
Therefore, the players’ payo¤s will be
¡
¦B;N (k;2) ¡ t;¦S;N (k;2) + t
¢
=( 1 :4;0:6):
Since 0:6 is greater than ¦S;S (k;0)+t = ¡0:085; the seller would choose to invest x =2 :
This proves Claim 2.
This example also illustrates a typical feature of the optimal contract: it speci…es an
investment level larger than the one parties are trying to induce, and, therefore, it is breached
in equilibrium.23;24
The next section shows, in the general setup, when the …rst-best can be induced and
when, even if the …rst-best is not achievable, contracting is still valuable in the sense that it
induces an investment level above the one chosen by the seller if no contract is signed (xw).
5. General Results
The Hold-Up Problem with Costless and Perfect Courts




with q>0 induces lower investments than the null contract; this is the result of Che and
23This is not necessarily the case. The reader can check that if ¯ =2 :15; then the contract k =( 2 ;2;6:1)
(which speci…es both the e¢cient investment and the e¢cient quantity) induces the investment x =2 .I na
more general setup, the contracted quantity may also di¤er from the quantity …nally traded.
24This enforcement technology can be reinterpreted in the setup of Bull (2001b). The natural way to
‘translate’ the non-veri…ability assumption to the setup in which documents are the primitives, is by assuming
that the set of available documents is not a¤ected by the investment level. We can then reinterpret our
example: a set of documents M is available with a 75% probability (independently of the investment made
by the seller) if the buyer spends $3:4. The parties can then sign the following contract:
‘The buyer will pay $6:1 to the seller in exchange for 2 units, unless the buyer presents the
documents M. In such a case, the seller will pay $2:8( 8 :9 ¡ 6:1) to the buyer, and the parties
will not be obliged to any other transaction.’
In equilibrium, the seller will choose to invest x =2and the buyer will not try to obtain the documents
M. (Note that in this case t is not an up-front payment, but still does not play any role.)




; the seller would solve
Max
0·x
t ¡ C (q)+( 1¡ ¹)fS (x) ¡ [V (x;q) ¡ C (q)]g¡x:





· Vx(x;q); (= if x>0):
Let us remember that xw is de…ned as the investment level the seller will choose if no
contract is signed (xw =a r g m a x
x¸0
(1 ¡ ¹)S (x) ¡ x; it satis…es S0 (xw)=( 1¡ ¹)
¡1): Since
S0 (x) is positive and decreasing in x,a n dVx (x;q) is positive, the …rst order condition
cannot be satis…ed if x>x w: Moreover, since Vx (x;q) is strictly positive unless q is zero, the
equilibrium investment (which must satisfy the …rst order condition) is maximized if q =0 :
The intuition for this result is the same we discussed in the previous section. By in-
creasing her investment, the seller does two things: …rst, she increases the total surplus; and
second, she improves the buyer’s bargaining position (V (x;q) increases): Because the seller
appropriates only a fraction (1 ¡ ¹) of the total surplus, the …rst e¤ect will induce her to
invest up to the x such that (1 ¡ ¹)S0 (x)=1(i.e., up to xw). The second e¤ect induces the
seller to invest even less. Since Vx;q (x;q) > 0 for any q>0; the higher q is the stronger the
incentive to underinvest. The optimal contract must then specify q =0 , and it induces xw:
The Hold-Up Problem with Costly and Imperfect Courts
The intuition from the example in the previous section is still valid in the more general
setup: if we want to induce an investment level x¤ >x w, we need a contract k such that the











0) > 0; for any x
0 <x
¤:
After manipulating the expressions for ¦B;C and ¦B;N; we see that the buyer’s payo¤
di¤erential between suing and not suing is:
¢(k;x) ´ ¦
B;C (k;x) ¡ ¦
B;N (k;x)=F [D(x;q) ¡ (1 ¡ ¹)V (x;q) ¡ ¹C (q)] ¡ ¯:
20This expression is strictly decreasing in x when q>0: Therefore, the above two conditions
reduce to ¢(k;x¤)=0 : Lemma 1 shows that this is a necessary condition to induce the
desired investment level x¤:
Lemma 1. For all x¤ > 0; if x¤ >x w and ¢(k;x¤) 6=0 ; then x¤ is not an equilibrium
investment level of the game de…ned by contract k.
Proof: see Appendix A.
The intuition for this result is simple: if ¢(k;x¤) > 0 and the seller invests x = x¤;
the buyer will choose to go to court. Given that she will be sued, it is easy to show that
the optimal investment for the seller is some x smaller than xw: On the other hand, if
¢(k;x¤) < 0; there will exist an investment x¤0 2 [xw;x ¤) such that she will not be sued
(¢(k;x¤0) · 0) and her payo¤ will be larger (¦S;N (k;x¤0) ¸ ¦S;N (k;x¤)).
Note that the necessary condition ¢(k;x¤)=0cannot be satis…ed if ¯ is too large or if
F is too small. Intuitively, in such cases it will never be optimal for the buyer to sue the
seller and, therefore, the seller would have the same incentives as if there were not a costly
court game.25
Let X¤ = fx¤:9k s.t. ¢(k;x¤)=0 g: Note that if
max
x;q
F [D(x;q) ¡ (1 ¡ ¹)V (x
¤;q) ¡ ¹C (q)] ¡ ¯>0;
there will be a continuum of contracts such that ¢(k;x¤)=0 :26
¢(k;x¤)=0is not only necessary for x¤ to be induced, but it also implies that the seller
would not ‘slightly’ underinvest: if she chooses to invest x¤ ¡ "; then it will be optimal for






.F o r" small, the total surplus will only be slightly a¤ected and ¦B;C (k;x¤ ¡ ")
will be nearly the same as ¦B;N (k;x¤).27 Since the total court expenditures (¯ + ¾) are
25This would also be the case if D(x;q) is too small relative to V (x;q) and C (q):
26Let us remember the assumptions that all functions are continuous, that V (x;0) = C (q)=0 ; and that
the expression [D(x;q) ¡ (1 ¡ ¹)V (x;q) ¡ ¹C (q)] is negative for q large enough.
27Recall that ¢(k;x¤)=0, ¦B;N (k;x¤)=¦ B;C (k;x¤).
21positive and non-negligible and the buyer’s payo¤ is ¦B;C (k;x¤ ¡ ")+¹(¯ + ¾); then it
necessarily holds that the seller’s payo¤ – equal to the total surplus minus the buyer’s payo¤
– is discretely reduced when she invests x¤ ¡ " instead of x¤:
To make sure that the seller does not prefer to ‘severely’ underinvest, we need to compare
her payo¤ when she invests x¤ and will not be sued with her payo¤ if she underinvests and
the parties settle before trial. The proof of Proposition 1 is straightforward.






0) ¸ 0; and (*)
¢(k;x
¤)=0 :
Proof: see Appendix A.
Although correct, Proposition 1 is not very informative. It says nothing about the optimal
contract or when condition (*) holds.
In the case the …rst-best level of investment is achievable, there would typically be a
continuum of contracts that can induce it; and all we can say in that case is that the




However, if the …rst-best is not achievable, then it has to be either because (*) is binding
for the equilibrium x¤,o rb e c a u s ef o ra n y">0 x¤ + "= 2 X¤ (i.e., there is no contract k
satisfying ¢(k;x¤ + ")=0 ).28
We need to further explore the restrictions imposed by ¢
¡
k;xFB¢
=0and (*) to be able
to say something about the optimal contract when xFB is not achievable and to characterize
under which circumstances this contract improves over the no contract case.
Lemma 1 implies that, if we want to induce x¤ 2 X¤; we can restrict attention to contracts
satisfying ¢(k;x¤)=0 : When this condition is satis…ed, equation (*) c a nb ew r i t t e na s
¹(¯ + ¾)+( 1¡ ¹)[S (x
¤) ¡ S (x
c)] ¡ x
¤ + x
c ¡ (1 ¡ F)(1¡ ¹)[V (x
¤;q) ¡ V (x
c;q)] ¸ 0;
(*’)
28As will become apparent, if an investment x>x w cannot be induced in equilibrium, then no other x0 >x
will be inducible. Moreover, if x can be induced in equilibrium, then any x00 2 [xw;x] will be inducible.
22where xc solves seller’s ‘cheating’ problem: max
0·x
¦S;S (k;x): The above expression is decreas-
ing in q since x¤ >x w ¸ xc (in the proof of Lemma 1 we show that xw ¸ xc).29 There-
fore, we can restrict attention to the contract with the lowest possible q that also satis…es
¢(k;x¤)=0 : If such a contract does not satisfy (*’); then x¤ cannot be induced.
For all x¤ 2 X¤; de…ne
b b q(x;x
¤) ´ minfq : F [D(x;q) ¡ (1 ¡ ¹)V (x
¤;q) ¡ ¹C (q)] ¡ ¯ =0 g:
Recall that we assumed that D(x;q) is increasing in x; then it is straightforward to show
that b b q(x;x¤) is decreasing in x and increasing in x¤ and, therefore, we can restrict attention
to contracts where x = X: Let b q(x¤) ´ b b q(X;x¤):
Proposition 2. Let xM be the maximum investment level that can be induced by any






Proof: see Appendix A.
Corollary 1. If an investment level x¤ >x w can be induced with a contract (x;q); then it
can also be induced with the contract (X;b q (x¤)):
Proof: see Appendix A.
Knowing what the optimal contract looks like (Proposition 2) and what conditions are
necessary and su¢cient to induce a particular investment level (Proposition 1), it is im-
mediate to characterize for which courts contracting will be valuable (an x¤ >x w can be
induced), and when the …rst-best will be achievable. This is done in Propositions 3 and 4
and illustrated with a numerical example below.
29The problem max
0·x0¦S;S (k;x0) c a nb er e w r i t t e na s
max
0·x0K +( 1¡ ¹)S (x0) ¡ x0 ¡ (1 ¡ F)(1¡ ¹)V (x0;q);
where K is a constant. The terms including x0 in the above expression are the same (with opposite sign)
that we have in (*’); therefore, by the envelope theorem, we can restrict attention to the direct e¤ect of q
on (*’).
23We derive our results in terms of the court game parameters (F;¯;¾) and the damage
function D(x;q): Abusing notation, we denote by xc (q;F) the optimal ‘cheating’ investment:
x




and by b q (x;¯=F) the smallest q that satis…es
F [D(X;q) ¡ (1 ¡ ¹)V (x;q) ¡ ¹C (q)] ¡ ¯ =0 :




F [D(X;q) ¡ (1 ¡ ¹)V (x




G(x;F;¯) ´ (1 ¡ ¹)[S (x) ¡ S (x
c (b q(x;¯=F);F))] ¡ x + x
c (b q (x;¯=F);F) ¡
(1 ¡ ¹)(1¡ F)[V (x; b q(x;¯=F)) ¡ V (x
c (b q(x;¯=F);F); b q(x;¯=F))]:
Proof: see Appendix A.
The …rst inequality is required for the existence of a contract k satisfying ¢(k;x¤)=0for
some x¤ >x w; and the second inequality implies that the contract (X;b q(xw;¯=F)) satis…es
(*’) for xw as a strict inequality. Then, by continuity, there must be a contract that induces
an investment level above x¤ >x w:



















Proof: see Appendix A.


















It is easy to show that for this example xFB =1and xw =0 :25:
Given a value of ¯ and an investment level x¤ 2 [0;X] that we want to induce, we de…ne
Fm (¯;x¤) as the smallest F 2 [0;1] that satis…es
max
q
F [D(X;q) ¡ (1 ¡ ¹)V (x
¤;q) ¡ ¹C (q)] ¡ ¯ ¸ 0; and
¹(¯ + ¾)+G(x
¤;F;¯) ¸ 0:
Note that the above expressions are both increasing in F: Then, if the buyer’s probability of
winning in court (F) is larger than Fm (¯;x¤), there will exist a contract k that induces an
investment x¤ (i.e., there will exist k such that ¢(k;x¤) is zero and (*’) is satis…ed). If for
a particular pair (¯;x¤) there is no F 2 [0;1] that satis…es both conditions, then x¤ cannot
be induced.
Figure B.1 illustrates this discussion for the numerical example proposed above. Figure
B.2 shows how Fm is a¤ected when ¾ increases to 0:35.
T h ec a s eo f F = 1
Two de…nitions are needed to characterize what can be implemented for the particular
case of F =1 : Let x(®) be the x ¸ xw that satis…es
(1 ¡ ¹)[S (x
w) ¡ S (x)] ¡ x
w + x = ® (see Figure B.3);







D(X;q) ¡ (1 ¡ ¹)V (X;q) ¡ ¹C (q) ¡ ¯ ¸ 0;
x :m a x
q
D(X;q) ¡ (1 ¡ ¹)V (x;q) ¡ ¹C (q) ¡ ¯ =0 otherwise:
25Corollary 2. Assume e x ¸ xw: If F =1 ; any x 2 [xw;minfe x;x(¹(¯;¾))g] can be induced.
Proof: see Appendix A.
The proof of Corollary 2 uses the fact that when F =1the optimal ‘cheating’ investment
level is xc = xw and condition (*’) simpli…es to ¹(¯ + ¾)+( 1¡ ¹)[S (x¤) ¡ S (xw)] ¡ x¤ +
xw+ ¸ 0: The de…nition of x(¹(¯ + ¾)) implies that the previous expression is non-negative
for any x¤ 2 [xw;x(¹(¯ + ¾))]:
Comparative Statics
The following corollaries are derived from Propositions 1 and 2.
Corollary 3. Assume the maximum inducible investment level xM is smaller than X: If ¾












¡ ¯ =0 :











¡¯>0 and xM is the maxi-
mum investment level that can be induced, then it has to be that (*’) is binding. An increase
in ¾ e a s e st h i sc o n s t r a i n t .
Corollary 4. Assume the maximum inducible investment level xM is smaller than X: If F
increases, then xM strictly increases:
Proof: see Appendix A.











which allows us to …nd a contract k0 such that ¢(k0;x 0)=0for some x0 >x M and (*’) is
still satis…ed.










¡ ¯ =0and ¯ is increased,
then xM strictly decreases.
26The proof is straightforward: q being the maximizer of the left hand side of the above
expression implies that if ¯ increases then the only way the equality can be satis…ed is by
decreasing xM:











¯>0 we cannot tell which is the e¤ect of ¯ on xM: In that case (and since xM is the largest
x we can induce), it necessarily holds that the inequality (*’) is binding:
¹(¯ + ¾)+G(x;F;¯)=0 :
Then, an increase in ¯ has two e¤ects that go in opposite directions: the …rst term above
obviously increases, but the increase in ¯ also a¤ects G(x;F;¯) negatively.





































































¡ Vq (xc;q) > 0),s ot h a tG(x;F;¯) decreases as ¯ increases (assuming
F<1).30
6. Extensions of the Basic Model - Discussion
Endogenous Court Expenditure
We have characterized above for which ‘courts of law’ – parameters (F;¯;¾) and function
D(x;q) – contracting has value and when the …rst-best can be achieved. We have chosen
such a simple model only for expositional ease and to highlight the main result: a costly
court, unable to obtain any information about the facts of the case, can help the parties.
30Consider Figure B.1 and assume xM =1and F =0 :5: Then if ¯ is small (approximately 0:4)a ni n c r e a s e
in ¯ would increase xM; while if ¯ is large (approximately 0:9) then its increase would decrease xM:
27There are at least two ways in which the model can be enriched and the results not be
a¤ected (or strengthened). First, we could endogenize ¯ and ¾ by assuming the parties’
expenditures a¤ect their probability of winning the trial and the amount of damages to be
paid. To remain consistent with the assumption that investment is not veri…able, neither
the probability of winning nor the damages should depend directly on the investment made.
Indirectly, the investment made by the seller will a¤ect the buyer’s incentives to go to court
(as in the simplest model) and to spend money on the litigation process.
In this more general model, we would have F(¢) and D(¢) as functions of ¯ and ¾,a n d
the parties would choose them to maximize their expected payo¤s. The court game would
then look like a rent-seeking game with an endogenous prize. Under suitable assumptions,
we can show that the equilibrium of this court game, (¯
¤;¾ ¤), is unique and strictly positive.
The outcome of this game, i.e. ¯
¤;¾¤;F(¯
¤;¾ ¤); and D(k;¯
¤;¾¤), is what we considered
here as our primitive ‘court of law.’
This way of extending the court game is appealing. The quality of lawyers (and their
salaries), the time spent to prepare for trial, the expert witnesses hired, etc. all a¤ect the
probability of winning or losing, and the amount of damages.31
Optimal Choice of Courts
Another extension (that could be combined with the previous one) is to assume that
parties have some discretion over which court to choose. In the simpler setup, we could
assume there is a set of available courts from which the parties can choose and they will pick
the one that allows them to induce the most e¢cient outcome possible. A way of considering
31An example that comes immediately to mind is the criminal case against O.J. Simpson. Despite the
enormous physical evidence, the defendant, after hiring a ‘dream team’ of lawyers and spending something
between 4 and 7 million dollars (Source: CNN) was found not guilty.
This is true not only in criminal cases, quoting S. Macaulay (1985), “if lawyers of equal ability represent
clients with equal resources and willingness to invest them in a case falling under Article II [of the Uniform
Commercial Code], the case will end in a tie. Those who can a¤ord to play invest in the skills of large law
…rms. They play the litigation game by expanding procedural complexity to draw out the process. Others
who cannot a¤ord to invest as much must drop out.”
28this alternative together with the previous one is by assuming that F and D(x;q) depend
not only on what the parties spend in court, but also on the contract the parties sign.
This extension is consistent with what we observe in reality. Parties can choose, to
some extent, the particular court they want to solve their potential disputes, and they do so
strategically. According to the Uniform Commercial Code (§1-105(1)), “...when a transaction
bears a reasonable relation to this state and also to another state or nation the parties may
agree that the law either of this state or of such other state or nation shall govern the rights
and duties.”32
The particular court chosen will a¤ect the litigation costs of the parties. If two corpo-
rations are located in two di¤erent states and they choose to be governed by the state law
of one of the parties’ state, we should expect the other one to face higher litigation costs
derived from having to hire lawyers licensed in the other state. If parties choose the law of
at h i r ds t a t e , 33 then both parties would probably face higher litigation costs.
The election of the particular state court may also a¤ect the probability of one or the
other party winning and the potential damages. Some state courts are more experienced than
others in particular matters and therefore their ruling may be easier to predict. Juries in
some states may be biased against large corporations and be prone to award large damages.
Choosing a particular court is not limited to the election of the state law that shall
govern the relationship. Even for the same state law, parties can still a¤ect their expected
litigation costs when designing the contract. For example, parties can agree on the contract
that any disputes will be solved by arbitration, which is typically cheaper than going to
trial.34 Moreover, once parties agree in the contract they will solve any disputes through
arbitration, they can still include di¤erent clauses that will a¤ect the cost of the arbitration
32If the two parties do not stipulate which state’s law they want to govern their contract, then, should
a dispute develop, each state will have a set of default rules called ‘choice of law rules.’ The default rules
typically say that the state that has the ‘greatest interest in the case’ should rule on the dispute.
33They can do so only if the transaction is somehow related to this third state.
34Arbitration is one of the several Alternative Dispute Resolution (A.D.R.) methods parties can choose.
Others are mediation, early neutral evaluation, and conciliation.
29mechanism.35
Hybrid Investment
Although we developed the case of purely cooperative investment, the main results extend
to the case of hybrid investment (investment a¤ects both the buyer’s value and the seller’s
costs), provided it is not ‘too sel…sh’.
In the case of cooperative investment our mechanism works because, given a contract
that satis…es ¢(k;x¤)=0 ; if the seller underinvests, the buyer has an incentive to go to
court. The intuition behind this is simple: the lower the investment, the lower the value of
the q units the buyer is committed to buy. Below a critical value of x (that depends on q)
the buyer simply prefers to go to court and, with probability F, avoid the commitment to
buy those q units.
In the case of hybrid investment, this intuition is incomplete. If the seller decreases her
investment, it will also a¤ect her costs. If her costs increase as she decreases x,36 her threat
point for the renegotiation worsens and this favors the buyer, who appropriates a fraction ¹
of the renegotiation surplus.
Analytically, the buyer’s payo¤ di¤erential between going to court or not is given by
¢(k;x)=F [D(x;q) ¡ (1 ¡ ¹)V (x;q) ¡ ¹C (x;q)] ¡ ¯:
In the case of cooperative investment, ¢(k;x)=0guarantees ¢(k;x0) > 0 for any x0 <x :
But in the case of hybrid investment, ¢(k;x) will be increasing or decreasing in x depend-
35Quoting DiCarlo (2002), ”they [arbitration clauses] can limit or eliminate the depositions, interrogatories,
document requests, and pretrial motions that are responsible for much of the sometimes crushing expense
of litigation. In recent years, courts have allowed the contracting parties broad discretion to make up any
rules they wish concerning who will hear the dispute and what rules will govern the outcome.”
36So far we assumed x is a quality enhancing investment and, therefore, it increases the buyer’s valuation
for the good.
In the case the investment a¤ects both the quality of the good and the production costs, there is no
‘natural’ assumption about the e¤ect of x on the production costs. For example, a higher x could be a better
quality and more expensive painting for cars that requires a di¤erent painting process. This high quality
painting process could, in principle, be cheaper or more expensive than the low quality one.
30ing on the sign of ¡(1 ¡ ¹)Vx(x;q) ¡ ¹Cx(x;q): Then, our results would extend, mutatis
mutandis, to the case of hybrid investment as long as (1 ¡ ¹)Vx (x;q) > ¡¹Cx(x;q):
Purely Sel…sh Investment
Consider now the case when seller’s investment a¤ects only her own costs and assume
Cx(x;q) < 0 and Cxq (x;q) < 0. In this case, Edlin and Reichelstein (1996) show that the
…rst-best can be achieved with a non-contingent contract. This result is derived for two
di¤erent court remedies, expected damages and speci…c performance. As is standard in the
literature, the breaching refers to one of the parties refusing to complete the transaction
and it is assumed that the court, at no cost, either enforces the contract (imposes speci…c
performance) or awards damages at no cost for the parties.
We reconsider the result in our setup assuming, as we have so far, that the buyer can
claim that the seller is not ful…lling other terms of the contract, di¤erent from the delivery
of the goods (as in most of the literature, we are assuming the delivery/acceptance of the
goods can be enforced at no cost).
The incentives for the buyer to sue are driven, as in the cooperative investment case, by
the payo¤ di¤erential between suing and not suing. In the case of sel…sh investment, and
assuming D(q)=V (q); this di¤erential can be written as
¢(q;x)=F¹[V (q) ¡ C (x;q)] ¡ ¯;




· 0 for any q; then the buyer will never sue the seller and the





























37Note that since the investment is sel…sh it does not a¤ect the buyer’s valuation. Then, the only relevant
variable for the contract is q:
31Proposition 5 below identi…es under which conditions the …rst-best is not achievable. For
simplicity we maintain the assumption that D(q)=V (q).38

























Proof: see Appendix A.
The intuition for this result is as follows. An investment level x¤ can, in principle, be
induced with two di¤erent types of contracts: one in which the buyer has no incentives to
sue (¢(k;x¤) · 0); and one in which the buyer would optimally sue (¢(k;x¤) > 0):




(see Appendix A). However, if q
¡
xFB¢
2 (qL (x);q H (x)); it will be optimal for the buyer to
sue if q = q
¡
xFB¢
and, therefore, there is no contract of the …rst type that induces xFB:
We show in Appendix A that if we want to induce xFB with the second type of contracts,















1¡F; then the required q will be too
large and the buyer will have no incentives to sue. Therefore xFB cannot be induced with
the second type of contract.
Note that the converse of Proposition 5 is not true. If (+) does not hold, then a contract
specifying q = q
¡
xFB¢
will induce x = xFB: However, if (+) still holds but (++) does not,
then x = xFB is not guaranteed. It could be the case that the seller, facing a contract that





1¡F; …nds it optimal to choose an investment x0 <x FB





1¡F only guarantees that
the seller will not deviate to an x0 such that the buyer still …nds it optimal to sue.
It is important to highlight that the negative result of Proposition 5 does not hold if
there is uncertainty either about the buyer’s valuation or the seller’s costs. Suppose the
38We maintain our assumptions about D(x;q)¡(1 ¡ ¹)V (x;q)¡¹C (q) made in Section 3. For the case
of sel…sh investment and assuming D(q)=V (q);.the assumptions are simply that V (q)¡C (x;q) is strictly
quasi-concave and negative for q large enough.




: The payo¤ di¤erential between going and not going to court for the buyer will now






























the buyer no incentives to sue (for any ¸)i fx = xFB; and x = xFB will be the solution to
the seller’s problem given that she will not be sued.
Suppose then that q
¡
xFB¢













: Then, if a contract speci…es q = Q; the buyer will
not sue the seller (for any x). It is trivial to show that the seller will choose an investment
level x>x FB:
On the other hand, if the contract speci…es a very small q (i.e., q =0 ), the seller will
choose some x0 <x FB: Since the seller’s payo¤ varies continuously with q;by the intermediate
value theorem there has to be a q 2 (0;Q) such that the seller invests xFB:
Liquidated Damages - Voided Contracts
Similar results to those obtained in Section 5 can be derived if we assume courts would
enforce any level of liquidated damages or if we assume that the court, rather than awarding
damages to compensate the buyer, would simply void the contract with probability F.
The case of liquidated damages is straightforward. Let L be the level of damages stipu-
l a t e di nac o n t r a c tk0,39 the payo¤ di¤erential for the buyer between suing and not suing is
now:
¢(k
0;x)=F [L ¡ (1 ¡ ¹)V (x;q) ¡ ¹C (q)] ¡ ¯:
To induce some x¤ >x w we still have to restrict attention to contracts satisfying
¢(k0;x)=0 : The only di¤erence with the case of expected damages is that now a large
39The parties will include an investment level in the contract only if it is necessary to give the buyer
grounds for suing. For the analysis made, the relevant contract will just be (L;q): Again, t only determines
the division of the surplus.
33¯ is not necessarily a problem. In the case of expected damages and for ¯ ‘too large’, it
might be that max
k
¢(k;x¤) < 0 and, therefore, x¤ would not be inducible. With liqui-
dated damages, by simply stipulating a larger L; this problem is solved. The only relevant
constraint is then (*’).
The case in which the court voids the contract when it …nds breach is analytically identical
to the case of liquidated damages. If the contract is voided, then the parties will not be
committed to any transaction and the seller will have to return any money paid by the
buyer in advance.




t ¡ (1 ¡ ¹)V (x;q) ¡ ¹C (q)
¤
¡ ¯:
Note that in this case t plays a non-trivial role; it has to be chosen to satisfy ¢(k00;x)=0 :40
Therefore, the parties cannot use t to achieve the division of the surplus they desire. They
must rely on a side payment to do this. This payment cannot be part of the contract nor
can it be legally associated to the transaction, or else it would be reversed when the contract
is voided.
7. Conclusions
We have considered a hold-up model with the following characteristics: only one party
invests, her investment is purely cooperative, and the parties can renegotiate the original
contract before going to court and/or after the court rules. The renegotiation process is
exogenously given. The main di¤erence with previous literature is the ‘enforcing technology’.
Unlike most of the literature where courts enforce contracts at no cost, we assume costly
litigation. The non-investing party can sue the other one claiming breach, and has a pos-
itive probability of prevailing in the trial.41 To be consistent with the assumption of non-
veri…ability of the investment, we assume that no information about the investment made is





41The breaching may refer to the seller underinvesting or not ful…lling some other conditions of the contract.
34revealed in the litigation process.
In this set up, we …nd that parties can improve over the non-contracting case by signing a
simple contract that can later be renegotiated. The contract is such that if the seller invests
the level the parties are trying to induce, the buyer’s payo¤ is the same whether he chooses
to sue or not. Therefore, for any investment level below the one parties intend to induce the
buyer will …nd optimal to sue the seller.
Although the trial stage is never reached (parties can always renegotiate and avoid paying
the court costs), when the seller underinvests the threat point for the renegotiation changes
and this can be enough to discourage the underinvesting.
To make our point clear we chose a very simple enforcement technology. A more so-
phisticated court model could be developed where the trial outcome would depend on the
players’ expenditure on the court game. Moreover, in reality we can expect the parties being
able to a¤ect, by changing the contract clauses, not only the probability of success in a trial
in favor of one or the other party but also the equilibrium court costs. We discussed these
possibilities in Section 6.
Our results give a plausible explanation of why we do not see in reality complicated
mechanisms as the ones suggested in the literature (i.e., message games or mechanisms to
avoid renegotiation).42 It may be that parties really do not need these mechanisms because
with simple contracts (and courts like the ones we assumed) they may achieve (or at least
approximate) the …rst-best outcome.
It is well known in the mechanism design literature that two parties can improve on their
implementation problem if they are allowed to include a third party in the contract or if they
can commit themselves to burning money. Our game structure is equivalent to a contract
where the buyer, after observing the investment made by the seller, sends a message that
determines, as speci…ed in the contract, a transfer from the buyer to the seller, transfers from
the buyer and seller to the third party (or simply how much money each party has to burn),
42For an interesting discussion about the possibility of parties committing themselves not to renegotiate
see Hart & Moore (1999) and Tirole (1999).
35and, with some probability, a change in the status quo point for the renegotiation. Before
sending that message, the buyer and seller are allowed to renegotiate the original contract.
By choosing the appropriate message-transfers functions, parties would be able to induce
the …rst-best level of investment.43
I ti sa l s ow e l le s t a b l i s h e dt h a tt h i sk i n do fc o n t r a c t sd o e sn o th e l pw h e nt h et h i r dp a r t y
can collude with one of the players, or if the parties have no way of committing themselves
to burning money. In our model, we make use of a real institution (the court) that allows
the parties to commit themselves to burning money: for the buyer to be compensated for the
alleged breach, he and the seller have to waste resources in the court game (lawyer fees, etc.).
Courts are particularly appealing as third parties because, ideally, they will not collude with
any of the parties. The burning money process is appealing as long as we consider realistic
the assumptions made about the way courts work.
43In our setup, the …rst-best may or may not be achievable, depending on the particular money burning
and seller-buyer transfer technology. The parties can manipulate this technology to some extent with the
initial contract, but they are restricted by the way the court works.
36A. Appendix: Proofs Missing from the Text
P r o o fo fL e m m a1 .
- Suppose the seller chooses x¤ >x w and ¢(k;x¤) > 0: Then the buyer will strictly prefer






Let xc be the solution to this problem. Then, the …rst order necessary condition requires:
(1 ¡ ¹)Sx (x
c) ¡ 1 ¡ (1 ¡ ¹)(1¡ F)Vx (x
c;q) · 0; ( = if x
c > 0).
Recall x¤ >x w , (1 ¡ ¹)S0 (x¤) < 1: Therefore the …rst order condition is not satis…ed if
xc = x¤:
- Suppose the seller chooses x¤ >x w and ¢(k;x¤) < 0: By continuity, there exist " such
that x¤ ¡ " ¸ xw and ¢(k;x¤ ¡ ") · 0: Then
¦
S;N (k;x
¤ ¡ ") ¡ ¦
S;N (k;x
¤)=( 1¡ ¹)[S (x
¤ ¡ ") ¡ S (x
¤)] ¡ x
¤ + " + x
¤ +
(1 ¡ ¹)[V (x
¤;q) ¡ V (x
¤ ¡ ";q)] > 0
since both lines on the right hand side are greater than zero. Therefore, it is not optimal for
the seller to invest x¤ >x w:
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 .








Facing such a contract, the seller has to choose her investment level: if she chooses x0 <x ¤;
then the buyer will prefer to sue
¢(k;x
¤)=0) ¢(k;x
0) > 0 if x
0 <x
¤:
The parties would settle out of court and the seller would end up with ¦S;S (k;x0); which,
by assumption, is smaller than what she would get by investing x¤.
37An argument similar to the one made for the proof of Lemma 1 implies she would never
optimally choose x0 >x ¤ ¸ xw when ¢(k;x¤)=0 :
( (by contradiction)
-Suppose x¤ is induced by contract k but ¢(k;x¤) 6=0 : Lemma 1 shows this is not possible.
-Suppose that for any contract k such that ¢(k;x¤)=0 ; ¦S;N (k;x¤) ¡ max
0·x0¦S;S (k;x0) < 0
holds. Then obviously the seller prefers to invest the x0 that solves max
0·x0¦S;S (k;x0); which is
always smaller than or equal to xw and therefore x¤ >x w is not induced in equilibrium.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 . (by contradiction).
*S u p p o s e(x;q) induces xM and x<X :





























and since b b q
¡
x;xM¢



































, the function ¢(¢) is strictly increasing in x;
increasing in q, and strictly decreasing in x: Therefore, there exist ">0; q0 such that





(X;q0);x M + "
¢
=0 :
- The function ¦S;N ¡
(x;q);x M¢
¡¦S;S ((x;q);x c (q;F)) is strictly decreasing in q (for F<1).























38-I f±>" ;then xM + " c a nb ei n d u c e dw i t ht h ec o n t r a c t(X;q0):











-S i n c e¢
¡
k;xM¢




(smallest q such ¢
¡
(X;q);x M¢
=0 ) implies that q>b q(xM):

























(X;q0);x M + "
¢
=0 :










"0);x M + "0¢
=0 :


































therefore the contract (X;q0
±) induces the investment level xM + ±>x M:
Proof of Corollary 1. Immediate from the proof of proposition 2.




F [D(X;q) ¡ (1 ¡ ¹)V (xw;q) ¡ ¹C (q)] ¡ ¯ · 0: Then there is no (x;q)
satisfying ¢(k;x)=0for any x>x w: Lemma 1 implies then that no x>x w can be
induced.
- Suppose ¹(¯ + ¾)+G(xw;F;¯) · 0: Note that by Corollary 1 we can restrict attention to
contracts of the form (X;b q(¢)): Note also that G(x;F;¯) is decreasing in x : as x increases




is well de…ned: ¢
¡




(X;q0);x M + ±
¢
>
0: Recall also that ¢
¡
(X;0);x M + ±
¢
< 0: Therefore, by continuity, there is some q00 < q0 such that
¢
¡
(X;q00);x M + ±
¢
=0 :
39b q(x;¯=F) increases and G(x;F;¯) decreases by
(1 ¡ ¹)(1¡ F)[Vq (x; b q(x;¯=F)) ¡ Vq (x
c (b q (x;¯=F);F); b q(x;¯=F))]:
Then ¹(¯ + ¾)+G(x;F;¯) < 0 8x>x w; and, by Proposition 1, no x>x w can therefore
be implemented.
)
- By Corollary 1 we can restrict attention to contracts of the form (X;b q (¢)): By continuity,
if ¹(¯ + ¾)+G(xw;F;¯) > 0 and max
q
F [D(X;q) ¡ (1 ¡ ¹)V (xw;q) ¡ ¹C (q)] ¡ ¯>0;
there is x>x w such that ¹(¯ + ¾)+G(x;F;¯) ¸ 0 and ¢((X;b q (x;¯=F));x)=0 ; and,
therefore, it can be implemented.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4 . Immediate from Propositions 1, and 2, and Corollary 1.
Proof of Corollary 2.
*N o t et h a tF =1implies xc = xw for any contract k: Condition (*’) then reduces to
¹(¯ + ¾)+( 1¡ ¹)[S (x) ¡ S (x
w)] ¡ x + x
w ¸ 0:
By de…nition of x(¹(¯ + ¾));
¹(¯ + ¾)+( 1¡ ¹)[S (x(¹(¯ + ¾))) ¡ S (x
w)] ¡ x(¹(¯ + ¾)) + x
w =0 :
S (x) being strictly concave and S0 (xw)=( 1¡ ¹) then imply
¹(¯ + ¾)+( 1¡ ¹)[S (x) ¡ S (x
w)] ¡ x + x
w ¸ 0; 8x 2 [x
w;x(¹(¯ + ¾))]:
* The de…nition of e x implies that b q(x) is well de…ned for any x 2 [xw;e x].
* Then, by Proposition 1, any x · min
©
x(¹(¯ + ¾));x FBª
can be implemented.











¡ ¯>0; then it has to be that
equation (*’) is binding. As ¾ is increased we can …nd x>x M such that (*’) is satis…ed
and ¢((X;b q (x));x)=0 :
40Proof of Corollary 4.
If xM can be induced, by Proposition 1, there must exist (x;q) such that
F
£

































A continuity argument, similar to the one of Proposition 3, allows us to conclude that there
is an x>x M such that ¹(¯ + ¾)+G(x;F;¯) ¸ 0 and ¢((X;b q(x;¯=F));x)=0and,
therefore, x can be implemented.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n5 .
* Suppose the contract (q) that induces the …rst-best is such that the buyer does not sue
the seller. The assumptions that V (q)¡C (x;q) is strictly quasi-concave and negative for q









Therefore, the seller will solve
max
x ¡ C (x;q)+( 1¡ ¹)[V (q (x)) ¡ C (x;q (x)) ¡ V (q)+C (x;q)] ¡ x:














But this equation holds only if q = q
¡
xFB¢









* Assume then that the contract (q) that induces the …rst-best is such that the buyer would








. In this case, the seller will solve
max
x (1 ¡ ¹)[V (q (x)) ¡ C (x;q (x))] ¡ F¹[V (q) ¡ C (x;q)] ¡
(1 ¡ ¹)V (q) ¡ ¹C (x;q) ¡ x ¡ ¾ +( 1¡ ¹)(¯ + ¾):
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Figure B.3: De…nition of x(®)
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